Editorial

“The cost of not enlarging the EU would be higher than that of joining.”

“The cost of not enlarging the EU would be higher than that of

Majlinda Bregu 

This is the conclusion of the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), adopted yesterday, which frames the enlargement of the EU as a strategic investment in the security, stability and geopolitical sustainability of the Union.

Delaying enlargement risks creating geopolitical grey areas, vulnerable to malign influences. Some candidate countries have already set ambitious targets for the conclusion of negotiations, even though the Union they will join will not be the same as it is today.

Matching AFET's conclusions with the current consultations on the EU's next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF 2028–2034) brings the debate back to a simple truth: money matters.

Of the many realities influencing this debate, one is particularly difficult to ignore (I hope): during this MFF cycle, several countries currently in the process of enlargement are expected to become EU Member States.

The draft MFF 2028–2034, worth around €2 trillion, places enlargement within the “Global Europe” chapter, which amounts to around €190–200 billion. Within it, the Enlargement and Neighbourhood Instrument is expected to receive around €42.6 billion, or just 2.2% of the total MFF.

These €42.6 billion currently cover:
   • all enlargement countries,
   • the neighbourhood policy,
   • and compete with global crises, security, migration and geopolitical priorities.

This architecture raises a fundamental question:

Is the EU's Medium-Term Financial Plan also taking into account the possibility of enlargement with new members or does it only count candidate countries?

If Albania and Montenegro join, per capita funding will necessarily have to increase. Currently, the Western Balkan countries (WB6) receive on average no more than 40 euros per capita per year.

Albania and Montenegro, the next two countries to join, will need 500–1000 euros per capita per year, which again leads me to this conclusion:

If the new MFF does not contain a clear transition mechanism for membership and assumes that enlargement can be absorbed without structural changes, then the European Union is risking remaining structurally unprepared for precisely the political outcome it today calls a strategic priority.

No less is the risk that a “budget war” between EU member states will turn accession into a debate over numbers, rather than a reforming, well-managed and planned integration process.
Precisely for this reason, the Western Balkan countries should come together and demand clarity on
   • a dedicated enlargement portfolio, within or parallel to “Global Europe”,
   • a clear transitional budgetary period to move from pre-accession to full membership,
   • and an MFF that matches political ambition with medium-term financial plans and above all geopolitical reality.

Editorial